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This paper analyses the dominant approaches to statutory 
interpretation through a historical lens. It argues that for most of South 
Africa's history the methods of interpretation were twisted in order to 
give effect to the intentions of the legislature. This approach to 
interpretation has now been discarded into the waste bin of history, and 
intentionalism has been replaced with contextualism. Or so we are told. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Natal Joint Municipal 
Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) has been 
hailed as the new, settled approach to interpretation, with the 
Constitutional Court endorsing Endumeni on numerous occasions. But 
it appears from both the judgments of the Constitutional Court and those 
of other Courts that intentionalism is not yet dead. This paper argues 
that the reason for this is because Endumeni has not provided clarity to 
the process of interpretation that it proclaims to do. 
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1 Introduction 
To what extent is the ordinary meaning of a word in a statute determinative 
of its legal meaning? For most of the 20th century we believed that the plain 
or ordinary meaning of a provision is almost always determinative of its legal 
meaning and that the broader context of an enactment such as other 
provisions in the same Act, headings, titles, preambles and debates on the  
floor of Parliament1 are of secondary concern, and to be invoked only when 
a word is vague, absurd or ambiguous. Our courts went about their 
interpretative exercise methodically: first find the ordinary meaning of a word 
or phrase. If the ordinary meaning is clear, the word or phrase should be 
given that clear meaning. If it is vague, absurd or ambiguous, then we may 
depart from the ordinary meaning to give the word or phrase a meaning 
intended by the legislature. This was known as the textualist, or as 
Professor Lourens du Plessis calls it, the literalist-cum-intentionalist 
approach to statutory interpretation, and it was the primary method for 
interpreting statutes for most of our history.2 But throughout the 20th century 
there were small cracks in the foundations of this approach, culminating 
eventually in a fracture which challenged the textualist approach. The case 
was Jaga v Donges and the decision was a dissenting one by Schreiner JA 
in which he proposed a different approach to interpreting statutes - one 
where the context of the legislation and the word or phrase being interpreted 
should be considered together.  
Schreiner's approach to statutory interpretation found intermittent approval 
in the latter part of the 20th century, but for the most part, our courts still 
relied on the old textualist approach. Today our courts seemingly embrace 
Schreiner's approach largely due to the intervention of Wallis JA in Natal 
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality, where he calls on 
us to consider interpretation as a unitary exercise, taking into account the 
                                                 
 Kessler Perumalsamy. LLB LLM, Lecturer, department of public law and 
jurisprudence, University of the Western Cape, South Africa. Advocate of the High 
Court of South Africa. Pupil member, Cape Bar. E-mail: kessper@capebar.co.za. I 
delivered a version of this paper at a conference on legal interpretation at the 
University of the Western Cape on 23 March 2018. I am grateful to the organisers,  
in particular Ms L Thomas and Ms M Nelson. I am especially grateful to Wessel le 
Roux and Pieter Koornhof for incalculable hours of debate and conversation.  
1  As regards Parliamentary debates, the Appellate Division rejected it as a source for 
determining the ordinary meaning. See for example Mathiba v Moschke 1920 AD 
354 paras 361-362; Mavromati v Union Exploration Import (Pty) Ltd 1949 4 SA 917 
(AD) para 927. But the issue has not been decided since.  
2  Cowen 1980 THRHR 374; Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes 93-96.  
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context and the provision being interpreted together.3 The Constitutional 
Court has endorsed Wallis JA's approach,4 and the Supreme Court of 
Appeal has eschewed reliance on the old textualist approach, with Wallis 
JA holding in a later case on contractual interpretation that "[the old 
approach] is no longer consistent with the approach to interpretation now 
adopted by South African courts in relation to contracts or other documents, 
such as statutory instruments or patents".5 But what are the reasons for this 
strong rejection? Does the new approach do something that the old 
approach couldn't? If Schreiner JA believed, as he did, that regardless of 
which approach one follows the result should be the same,6 why the strong 
rejection of the old approach?  
This article does not make the case for a return to the old approach because 
the old approach is flawed. But Endumeni has not provided respite to the 
incoherent chain-novel that is statutory interpretation in South Africa. The 
stated aim of Endumeni was to provide "greater clarity about the task of 
interpretation".7 Lawyers and courts are no longer required to show that a 
word has an ordinary meaning that is not absurd, vague or ambiguous. They 
simply have to point out the objective meaning of a word having regard to 
the context. But Endumeni has not had the stabilising effect on statutory 
interpretation that it hoped. And, I believe that the courts will sound this 
message in the near-future too. But all is not lost. For the goals of Endumeni 
to be achieved, two things need to happen: Firstly, a theoretical approach 
to determining the ordinary meaning needs to be provided. This requires 
more than merely suggesting "look at the context". Secondly, the contextual 
considerations that may be taken into account must be limited. This article 
addresses the latter concern, namely the use of an unlimited context in 
interpreting statutes. A theoretical approach to determining the ordinary 
meaning is provided elsewhere.8 
My aim is to show that Endumeni has not solved the problems which have 
plagued statutory interpretation for more than a century and that its 
                                                 
3  Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) 
paras 17-26 (hereafter Endumeni). 
4  The Constitutional Court has relied on Endumeni in dozens of cases, but it was first 
approved in 2013 in two cases: KwaZulu Natal Joint Liaison Committee v MEC 
Department of Education, KwaZulu Natal 2013 4 SA 262 (CC) para 128; and 
National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC) para 96. 
5  Bothma-Bato Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport 2014 2 SA 494 
(SCA) para 12 (hereafter the Bothma-Bato case). 
6  Jaga v Donges 1950 4 SA 653 (A) para 664B (hereafter the Jaga case). 
7  Endumeni para 24.  
8  Le Roux and Perumalsamy Constitutional Perspectives on Statutory Interpretation. 
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emphasis on the context is flawed. My prediction is that our courts will 
caution the overuse of context in future cases, and they may even determine 
that there are certain contextual factors, such as legislative history, that are 
impermissible to consult. I begin in Part II by tracing the historical conflict 
between the words and the context in the interpretation of statutes in South 
Africa. This is done to show that even after Endumeni, the interpretation of 
statutes in South Africa is as inconsistent as it was during the 20 th century. 
In Part III I argue that Endumeni should not be read as embracing the kind 
of contextualism offered by Schreiner JA in Jaga. Finally, in Part IV I argue 
that there is a limited role for the context to play, using the jurisprudential 
debate between HLA Hart and Lon Fuller in the pages of the Harvard Law 
Review.9 
2 The text and the context: A brief history 
Fidelity to the text over its context in South Africa has its roots in the 1875 
decision of the Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope. In De Villiers v 
Cape Divisional Council, John Henry de Villiers CJ decided that the rules of 
statutory interpretation should be determined with reference to English law 
rather than Roman Dutch law. He justified the adoption of the English 
approach to statutory interpretation over the Roman Dutch law approach by 
remarking that:10  
[I]n construing statutes made in this colony after the cession to the British 
Crown, this court should, in my opinion, be guided by the decisions of English 
Courts and not the Roman Dutch authorities … some of the older (English) 
decisions … lay down rules which bear a close similarity to those of the Civi l  
law. 'Every statute' says Lord Coke, 'ought to be expounded not according to 
the letter but according to the meaning: qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice.' 
There seems no doubt, however, that the enlarged or extensive interpretation 
of statutes which was admitted in former times has given way (except it would 
appear in old statutes) to restrict observance of the literal and grammatical 
sense of the words employed. The current of modern decisions seems to be 
in favour of considering the literal meaning of words in which the statute is 
expressed as the primary index to the intention with which the statue was 
made, and to abide by the literal meaning even where it varies from other 
indications of the actual intention of the Legislature. 
Twenty years after Cape Divisional Council was decided, the same 
approach was surprisingly taken by the Supreme Court of Transvaal. In 
Hess v The State,11 Kotze CJ, who had championed Roman Dutch law 
                                                 
9  Hart 1958 Harv L Rev 593; Fuller 1958 Harv L Rev 630. 
10  De Villiers v The Cape, Divisional Council 1875 Buchanan 1980 50 71. 
11  Hess v The State 1895 2 ORC 112.  
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during his long judicial career,12 cited with approval a number of English 
authorities in favour of the textualist approach to statutory interpretation.13 
By the close of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, 
textualism, as it had been embraced in England, had established its roots 
in South Africa. And these roots would continue to find nourishment for 
decades to come because of the 1907 locus classicus in statutory 
interpretation, Venter v Rex.14 
Venter's case concerned the meaning of the words "any person entering" in 
terms of section 3 of Ordinance 20 of 1905. Section 3 provided that any 
person entering the Transvaal would be guilty of an offence if he had been 
convicted of a crime in any place other than the Transvaal. Venter was born 
in the Cape Colony but later moved to the Transvaal where he became a 
citizen and resided for six years. He then moved to Natal and later the 
Orange River Colony where he stayed for another six years. During his 
residence in the Orange River Colony he was convicted of theft before the 
High Court at Bloemfontein and was sentenced to a year's imprisonment. 
Having served his sentence, he decided to return to the Transvaal in 
January of 1907 and was arrested eight months later for contravening 
section 3 of the Ordinance. The question before the Supreme Court of 
Transvaal was whether "any person entering" included someone like 
Venter, who was not entering the Transvaal for the first time but re-entering 
it. Innes J stated what became the golden rule of statutory interpretation as 
follows:15 
[W]hen to give the plain words of the statute their ordinary meaning would lead 
to [an] absurdity so glaring that it could never have been contemplated by the 
legislature, or where it would lead to a result contrary to the intention of the 
legislature, as shown by the context or by such other considerations that the 
Court is justified in taking into account, the Court may depart from the ordinary  
effect of the words to the extent necessary to remove the absurdity and to give 
effect to the true intention of the legislature. 
So statutory interpretation in South Africa, as in England,16 required our 
courts to do four things:  
                                                 
12  Cowen "Prolegomenon to a Restatement of the Principles of Statutory Interpretation "  
113. For an interesting account of Kotze CJ, see Van der Merwe Brown v Leyds. 
13  Cowen "Prolegomenon to a Restatement of the Principles of Statutory Interpretation "  
118.  
14  Venter v Rex 1907 TS 910.  
15  Venter v Rex 1907 TS 910 914-915.  
16  See in particular the 19th century decision of Lord Wensleydale's golden rule in Grey 
v Pearson 6 H L Cas 106 and Popkin Statutes in Court 9.  
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a) Find the literal meaning of a word. This may be done by looking at the 
meaning it has in the dictionary and using the common law canons of 
construction to determine the most likely operation of a word or phrase.  
b) If the literal meaning is absurd, vague or ambiguous, we may depart 
from that meaning.  
c) But when we depart from the literal meaning we have to give the word 
a meaning intended by the legislature.  
d) The meaning intended by the legislature can be determined only by a 
limited context17, that is, by what Parliament actually said in the rest of 
the enactment in other sections, titles, preambles, margins, headings 
and so on. One may not imaginatively reconstruct the will of Parliament 
by wondering how it would reasonably interpret a particular word.18  
Despite the fact that Venter remained the most cited case on statutory 
interpretation in the 20th century,19 shortly after it was decided cracks in the 
foundation of this textualist approach gradually emerged. In 1912 Jacob de 
Villiers JA refused to abide by the plain meaning of the words in an Act 
governing prescription and instead cited a number of Roman Dutch 
authorities for the proposition that20 
… the enquirer must take account of … context, and the reason of the law 
(ratio legis) … the history of the law in general … and [the] particular legal 
institutions about which the law to be interpreted deals (logical, systematic, 
historical interpretation). 
Eight years later he made the same argument in dissent in the leading 
company law case, Dadoo v Krugersdorp Municipality. Here de Villiers JA 
was unwilling to agree with the majority decision that an Act which 
prevented Indian persons from owning property in the Transvaal did not 
apply to a company, even where the shareholders of the company are 
Indian. So instead he desperately cited the Digest, Donellus, Dernburg and 
other Roman Dutch authorities to escape the plain meaning of the statute - 
a plain meaning which he conceded did not prohibit a company, even one 
where the shareholders were Indian - from owning property.21 According to 
him, statutory interpretation required more than attention to the letter of the 
                                                 
17  Rex v Detody 1926 AD 198 229; Principle Immigration Officer v Hawabu 1936 AD 
26.  
18  R v Westenraad 1941 OPD 103 105; Seluka v Susk in and Salkow 1912 TPD 257.  
19  Cowen 1980 THRHR 399.  
20  Seluka v Susk in and Salkow 1912 TPD 257 (de Villiers JA dissenting).  
21  Dadoo v Krugersdorp Municipality 1920 AD 530 574  
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law; the spirit of the law was sometimes more important, especially where 
Indians "float themselves into a private company with limited liability for the 
purpose of acquiring land".22 
The emphasis on Roman Dutch authorities was perhaps most 
authoritatively made by Dr (later Chief Justice) LC Steyn in his famous 
scholarly contribution, Die Uitleg van Wette. But even before the publication 
of its first edition in 1946, opposition to the strict textualism of English law in 
favour of the more purposive Roman Dutch law authorities could be found 
in the law reports. One such example is the decision of Davis J in De Villiers 
v Cape Law Society, where he remarked that:23  
There are a number of authorities dealing with the construction of a Statute in 
accordance with its spirit rather than with the literal meaning of the words 
used. I may first usefully refer to the somewhat neglected Roman-Dutch Law 
upon the subject. Voet 1.3.20 says: "That the legislator wished to depart from 
the proper signification of the words can be gathered from the antecedent or 
subsequent words of the law, from its preface, its conclusion, and the like; also 
from the reason of the law underlying the law itself: also from the fact that the 
words, if accepted in their proper signification would involve an absurdity, an 
impossibility, a defect, or a meaning not sufficiently suitable for carrying out 
the thing intended: these points are too well known to need any greater 
confirmation. 
Steyn's work on statutory interpretation attempted to restore Roman Dutch 
purity at a time when the rules of statutory interpretation had for the most 
part already developed along the lines of English law.24 Die Uitleg van Wette 
was the first legal textbook in South Africa to be published in Afrikaans and 
even though it went through many editions and for many years was the only 
textbook on this subject, it remained untranslated. Edwin Cameron argued 
that this was intended to make plain to the world that "Steyn was a Roman 
Dutch purist determined to resist and, if possible, eradicate the pervasive 
grasp that English law and legal concepts had gained on the South African 
legal system…"25 Evidence of this can also be seen in the fact that he 
exclusively quotes from Roman Dutch authorities to support all of the 
interpretive presumptions in his book, despite the fact that we had already 
embraced English authorities to do the same thing.26 He laments the 
introduction of English rules on statutory interpretation by de Villiers CJ in 
Cape Divisional Council, and makes the usual prosaic purist arguments to 
                                                 
22  Dadoo v Krugersdorp Municipality 1920 AD 530 562, 569.  
23  De Villiers v Cape Law Society 1937 CPD 428 431.  
24  Cameron 1982 SALJ 45.  
25  Cameron 1982 SALJ 40.  
26  Cameron 1982 SALJ 45; Cowen "Prolegomenon to a Restatement of the Principles 
of Statutory Interpretation" 118.  
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show that the introduction of English principles to govern statutory 
interpretation was erroneous.27 Steyn acknowledges that the vast majority 
of Roman Dutch authority on statutory interpretation is anti-textualist, unlike 
its English counterpart. English law, however, had only embraced the 
formalist text-based approach during the 17th and 18th centuries. For much 
of England's early history, the approach to statutory interpretation was one 
based on equity rather than the letter of the law.  
In the 12th and 13th centuries medieval judges had the same freedom in their 
interpretation of legislation as they did in the application of the common 
law.28 This was because the legislative text was seen as having no special 
authority in itself, largely because the sovereignty of Parliament had not 
established itself as it did in the late 17th century.29 Judges during this period 
were essential in the drafting of statutes and would often impose the 
underlying policy considerations of the statute rather than the letter of the 
statute.30 Indeed, it was once remarked by Hengham CJ to a litigant 
attempting to exposit a statute of 1285 that he should not "gloss the statute, 
for we understand it better than you: we made it."31 Similar expressions can 
be found in other cases of this period including that of Bereford CJ who, 
though not personally involved in drafting the legislation in question, 
determined that it was perfectly acceptable to read words into legislation as 
the drafters had negligently omitted to include what they meant.32 Equity 
was thus central to the interpretation of legislation in England, and was 
rooted in the Aristotelian idea that the spirit of the text informed the meaning 
of the text over general words which were inherently deficient in covering 
every case.33 So strong was the view of equity at the time that it was even 
believed by some that the common law could overrule statutes enacted by 
Parliament. In the Bonham's Case of 1610, Coke CJ observed that "It 
appears in our books that in many cases the common law will control acts 
of parliament and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void; for when an 
Act of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or 
                                                 
27  Steyn Uitleg van Wette xxiv. For a response to the purist argument, see Cameron 
1982 SALJ 43-45.  
28  Baker Introduction to English Legal History 209.  
29  Baker Introduction to English Legal History 209. 
30  Baker Introduction to English Legal History 209. 
31  Aumeye's Case (1305) YB 33-5 Edw I 82.  
32  Belyng v Anon (1312) B & M 52 53. Here it was possible to enlarge a statute based 
on equity by providing a remedy against the warden of the Fleet Prison to apply to 
all gaolers.  
33  Baker Introduction to English Legal History 209.  
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impossible to be performed, the common law will control it and adjudge it as 
being void."34 
Another important case which reflects the powerful role of equity at the time 
in English Courts is one which has often been embraced by our courts and 
continues to find application: the mischief rule of the Heydon's Case.35 
Heydon is generally seen as authority for a purposive approach to 
interpretation in England, and elsewhere, by allowing judges to consider any 
defects in law for which Parliament has provided a remedy, and adopt an 
interpretation which supresses the mischief and advances the remedy 
according to the true intention of the legislative drafters.36 Although this 
particular aspect of equity, namely correcting the mischief, survives in 
England today,37 other aspects of equity such as supplementing legislative 
text would not last, as the century following the Heydon Case brought about 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which would establish a sovereign 
Parliament and fundamentally alter the course of statutory interpretation in 
England and in turn in South Africa. 
The late 17th and 18th centuries saw a rejection of the equitable approach to 
statutory interpretation in England.38 Blackstone's rejection of the power of 
English courts to overturn legislation enacted by Parliament and of the 
tradition that legislation should be construed within the bounds of the 
enactment would have a pervasive influence over statutory interpretation in 
England for centuries to come.39 When Lord Denning MR attempted to 
resurrect the equitable approach to statutory interpretation in a 1950 
decision by filling in gaps in the words, he was rebuked on appeal by the 
House of Lords as "nakedly usurping the function of the legislature under 
the thin guise of interpretation."40 Equity thus yielded to fidelity to the text.  
Roman Dutch law on the other hand has always preferred the spirit of the 
law over its black letter. Although one may find sporadic indications that the 
letter trumps the spirit in some Roman Dutch authorities,41 they are 
                                                 
34  Dr Bonham's Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 114. 
35  Department of Land Affairs v Goedgekegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 10 BCLR 
1027 (CC) para 53; Olitzk i Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 3 SA 1247 
(SCA) para 12; Hleka v Johannesburg City Council 1949 2 SA 842 (A). 
36  Devenish 1991 De Jure 77, 90.  
37  Baker Introduction to English Legal History 212. 
38  Baker Introduction to English Legal History 211.  
39  Baker Introduction to English Legal History 211. 
40  Magor and St Mellons RDC v Newport BC [1952] AC 189 191.  
41  See in particular Digest 14.1.20 and 32.25.1 cum in verbis nulla ambiguitas est, non 
debet admitti voluntatis quaestio/ where there is no ambiguity in the words made use 
of, no question as to the intention of the testator should be raised.  
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overshadowed by the vast majority of authorities which place the spirit at 
the heart of all interpretive inquiries.42 In the Corpus Juris Civilis, it was said 
that "interpretation is not proper without taking into consideration an entire 
law, either to decide, or give an opinion on any particular portion."43 This is 
known as interpretation ex vercribus actus or interpretation from the "entrails 
or bowels of an Act", which looks towards the broader context of the 
legislation enacted rather than the words in isolation of its context.44 
Similarly, in the period of the aequitas, the principle function of the 
interpreter was to seek the intention behind the word and the form.45 Even 
Steyn, in addition to his rebuke in Cape Divisional Council, notes that 
Roman Dutch law at its core is anti-textualist.46 I mention this only because 
it would seem natural and even inevitable that Steyn would embrace these 
anti-textualist traditions in his Uitleg van Wette. But Steyn does not embrace 
the natural law traditions that pervade Roman Dutch law.47 And although 
Steyn expresses disapproval of the textualist approach the first chapter of 
his book is entirely textualist, being dedicated to the primary rule of 
interpretation, which concerns determining the literal and grammatical 
meaning of words, and when they are ambiguous ascribing a meaning to 
them intended by the legislature. Perhaps it is the case that Steyn was 
reluctant to fully embrace the Roman Dutch traditions of statutory 
interpretation because they could not be reconciled with his "executive-
mindedness" so famously captured by Edwin Cameron in his assessment 
of Steyn's contribution to our law.48 So Steyn does very little to truly revive 
the Roman Dutch traditions of statutory interpretation in South Africa. 
Instead, his work is more akin to the English textualist approach in Cape 
Divisional Council, except that this time it is covered in civilian drag.49 After 
Steyn's contribution, dependence on the Roman Dutch authorities for 
greater reliance on the context was almost non-existent and the next big 
break for the context in statutory interpretation would come from Schreiner 
JA's famous 1950 dissenting opinion in Jaga v Donges.50 
                                                 
42  Digest 1.3.17; 1.3.18; 30.10.7 2; Cowen "Prolegomenon to a Restatement of the 
Principles of Statutory Interpretation" 113.  
43  Digest Book XI, 1.3.24. 
44  Devenish 1989 SALJ 68 69 
45  Celsius D1.3.17. 
46  Steyn Uitleg van Wette 71.  
47  Devenish Interpretation of Statutes 23.  
48  Cameron 1982 SALJ 38, 45. 
49  Cowen "Prolegomenon to a Restatement of the Principles of Statutory Interpretation "  
118. Cowen calls Steyn's achievement "pure English law in civilian garb".  
50  Cowen 1980 THRHR 393.  
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Jaga's case concerned the interpretation of the words "sentenced to 
imprisonment". The two appellants, Jaga and Bhana, had pleaded guilty to 
a statutory offence and were sentenced by a magistrate to a fine of 50 
pounds or three months in hard labour, and a further three months 
suspended for three years, conditional upon the appellants not being 
convicted of a similar offence. But there was a bigger problem for Jaga and 
Bhana. By law the Minister of the Interior could remove "undesirable 
inhabitants" from the Union if they had been sentenced to imprisonment. 
Jaga and Bhana argued that "sentenced to imprisonment" means that they 
must have been sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment. Because no 
jail-time was given, the Minister, according to them, had no right to remove 
them from the Union. For Centlivres JA, this was a simple matter of 
determining whether the ordinary meaning of "sentenced to imprisonment" 
includes a suspended sentence. The answer for him was yes. But Schreiner 
JA disagreed.  
Schreiner began his dissent by pointing out that there are two ways to go 
about statutory interpretation. The first is to do it methodically as Venter's 
case does. He then proposes a second approach, where the context is not 
relegated to a secondary consideration to be utilised only when the word is 
vague, absurd or ambiguous. According to Schreiner our understanding of 
what a particular word means is contingent on its context - we do not 
understand words divorced from the circumstances in which they are 
used.51 So it logically follows that when we give meaning to words we should 
give meaning to them in the context in which they are used, instead of 
considering the context only at a later stage when we have doubts. But for 
Schreiner, the context is wider than merely the context of the enactment. It 
includes its purposes, its background, and the practical consequences of 
one interpretation in comparison with another.52 
Schreiner's approach found intermittent approval in the second half of the 
20th century. But it did not replace the old approach. Some courts cited it 
with approval, as can be seen from the concurring judgment of Joubert AJA 
in Ebrahim v Minister of the Interior;53 Wessels AJA in Stellenbosch 
Farmers' Winery v Distillers Corporation SA;54 and Rabie CJ in University of 
Cape Town v Cape Bar Council, to name but a few. But there were always 
decisions by the Appellate Division to the opposite, endorsing the old 
                                                 
51  Jaga 664D-F.  
52  Jaga 662G-H.  
53  Ebrahim v Minister of the Interior 1977 1 SA 665 (AD). 
54  Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery Ltd v Distillers Corporation SA Ltd 1962 1 All SA 485 
(A).  
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textualist approach, as can be seen in Public Carriers Association, where 
Smalberger JA remarks "it must be accepted that the literal interpretation 
principle is firmly entrenched in our law and I do not seek to challenge it."55 
So, after more than a century of inconsistent and grossly contradictory 
jurisprudence on the text and the context, it seems a respite that Wallis JA 
has solved the problem by adopting Schreiner's approach as the law to be 
followed in Endumeni, The back and forth has been ended with the 
Constitutional Court endorsing Endumeni, and any attempt to get the 
pendulum swinging again has been rejected by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal when Wallis JA himself later holds in Bothma-Bato that the old 
approach is dead.56 Well… this is not quite true.  
In a growing number of judgments that cite Endumeni, it seems that it is 
often cited only for the proposition that it is the correct approach to the 
interpretation of statutes, wills and contracts. But immediately after this, our 
courts revert to the ordinary meaning as it was intended by the legislature 
or contracting parties, doing the exact opposite of Endumeni. In addition to 
this, even though Endumeni was decided in 2012 and first endorsed by the 
Constitutional Court in 2013,57 in a number of decisions the Constitutional 
Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and some divisions of the High Court 
have endorsed Endumeni and the old approach to statutory interpretation 
simultaneously without recognising the contradiction. Here are a few 
examples that illustrate this point: in Grindstone Investments the 
Constitutional Court cites Endumeni as the authority for the approach to 
interpretation, but in the paragraph immediately following this it cites a 
decision by the Appellate Division calling for words to be given their ordinary 
grammatical meaning used by the parties in a contract.58 In Excellerate 
Holdings, Meyer J cites Endumeni as authority for the established principles 
of interpretation, but in the paragraph immediately following it cites authority 
for determining the intention of the legislation, doing the exact opposite of 
Endumeni.59 In Public Servants Association, Nkabinde ADCJ tells us that 
we may depart from the ordinary meaning of words when there is an 
                                                 
55  Public Carriers Association v Toll Road Concessionaries (Pty) Ltd 1990 1 SA 925 
(A).  
56  See Bothma-Bato [12]. Also see Novaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Maphil Trading 
(Pty) Ltd 2016 1 SA 518 SCA. 
57  See in particular KwaZulu Natal Joint Liasion Committee v MEC Department of 
Education, KwaZulu Natal 2013 4 SA 262 (CC) para 128; National Credit Regulator 
v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC) para 96.  
58  Trinity Asset Management (Pty) Ltd v Grindstone Investments 132 (Pty) Ltd 2018 1 
SA 94 (CC) para 52.  
59  Reezen Ltd v Excellerate Holdings Ltd 2018 6 SA 571 (GJ) paras 43-44.  
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absurdity, contrary to her Court's endorsement of Endumeni.60 In Jordaan 
Fourie J begins the interpretive exercise by citing authority for finding the 
"intention of the rule maker" and then follows this with Endumeni, failing to 
recognise the contradiction between the two approaches.61 In Mitchell 
Baartman AJA cites authority for the old approach and Endumeni in the 
same paragraph without any reference to the fact that the old approach has 
been overturned.62 In 2016 Henney J tells us in Nteta that we may depart 
from the ordinary meaning of the words only when it is absurd - overlooking 
Endumeni entirely.63 In 2017 Mhlantla J cites both Endumeni and Cool Ideas 
as the approach to statutory interpretation despite the fact that the two 
cases offer contradictory approaches to statutory interpretation. And most 
recently, Mogoeng CJ overlooks Endumeni, and the fact that it has been 
endorsed by the Constitutional Court dozens of times, by describing the 
operation of the contextual setting in the same terms as the old approach:64  
Some of those key interpretive aides that have by now become trite are the 
textual or ordinary grammatical meaning, context, purpose and consistency 
with the Constitution. Context comes into operation where the ordinary 
grammatical meaning is not particularly helpful or conclusive. And contextual 
interpretation requires that regard be had to the setting of the word or provision 
to be interpreted with particular reference to all the words, phrases or 
expressions around the word or words sought to be interpreted. This exercise 
might even require that consideration be given to other subsections, sections 
or the chapter in which the key word, provision or expression to be interpreted 
is located.  
The cases referred to above are but a few of many more judgments that do 
the same thing. So it is clear that the problems that have plagued statutory 
interpretation for the last century have not gone away. And it is unlikely that 
things will change, but this doesn't have to be the case. It is almost certainly 
the case that the inconsistency is no longer a result of the conflict between 
Roman Dutch purists on the one hand and the modernists who have 
embraced English law on the other. Perhaps it is the case that our judges 
have inadvertently overlooked the demands of Endumeni, or that, as in 
many judgments from the 1950s onwards, they simply invoke the approach 
that achieves the outcomes they desire.65 Or could it be the case that the 
                                                 
60  Public Servants Association v Head of Department of Health, Gauteng 2018 2 SA 
365 (CC) para 43.  
61  Jordaan v Tshwane City and Four Similar Cases 2017 2 SA 295 (GP) para 69.  
62  Tshwane City v Mitchell 2016 3 SA 231 (SCA). 
63  S v Nteta 2016 2 SACR 641 (WCC). 
64  AfriForum v University of the Free State 2018 2 SA 185 (CC) para 43. Emphasis 
added. 
65  See in particular, Swart v Cape Fabrix (Pty) Ltd 1979 1 SA 195 (A); Seluka v Susk in 
and Salkow 1912 TPD 257; and Van der Westhuizen v Arnold 2002 6 SA 453 (SCA).   
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demands of Endumeni are unclear? Does Endumeni provide us with the 
guidance we need when looking at the context, and is the approach of 
Schreiner JA in Jaga the same as that of Wallis JA in Endumeni?  
3 Battle of the context: return of the Jaga? 
In order to answer these questions, we need to look at what exactly 
Endumeni does, and to do that I begin (and end) with the text of Wallis JA's 
judgment. I quote extensively from the judgment with emphases in italics, 
so that the exact demands of Endumeni are clear. He begins in paragraph 
18 by stating that:66 
Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a 
document, be it legislation, some other statutory instrument, or contract, 
having regard to the context provided by reading the particular provision or 
provisions in the light of the document as a whole and the circumstances 
attendant upon its coming into existence. Whatever the nature of the 
document, consideration must be given to the language used in the light of 
the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision 
appears; the apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known 
to those responsible for its production. Where more than one meaning is 
possible each possibility must be weighed in the light of all these factors. The 
process is objective not subjective. A sensible meaning is to be preferred to 
one that leads to insensible or unbusiness like results or undermines the 
apparent purpose of the document. Judges must be alert to, and guard 
against, the temptation to substitute what they regard as reasonable, sensible 
or businesslike for the words actually used. To do so in regard to a statute or 
statutory instrument is to cross the divide between interpretation and 
legislation. In a contractual context it is to make a contract for the parties other 
than the one they in fact made. The 'inevitable point of departure is the 
language of the provision itself', read in context and having regard to the 
purpose of the provision and the background to the preparation and 
production of the document. 
Wallis JA then goes on to say at paragraph 19 of the judgment that:67  
All this is consistent with the 'emerging trend in statutory construction'. It 
clearly adopts as the proper approach to the interpretation of documents the 
second of the two possible approaches mentioned by Schreiner JA in Jaga v 
Dönges NO and another, namely that from the outset one considers the 
context and the language together, with neither predominating over the other. 
This is the approach that courts in South Africa should now follow,  without the 
need to cite authorities from an earlier era that are not necessarily consistent 
and frequently reflect an approach to interpretation that is no longer 
appropriate. The path that Schreiner JA pointed to is now received wisdom 
elsewhere. 
                                                 
66  Emphasis added. 
67  Emphasis added. 
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And lastly at paragraph 20:68  
Unlike the trial judge I have deliberately avoided using the conventional 
description of this process as one of ascertaining the intention of the 
legislature or the draftsman, nor would I use its counterpart in a contractual 
setting, 'the intention of the contracting parties', because these expressions 
are misnomers, insofar as they convey or are understood to convey that 
interpretation involves an enquiry into the mind of the legislature or the 
contracting parties. The reason is that the enquiry is restricted to ascertaining 
the meaning of the language of the provision itself.  Despite their use by 
generations of lawyers to describe the task of interpretation it is doubtful 
whether they are helpful. Many judges and academics have pointed out that 
there is no basis upon which to discern the meaning that the members of 
Parliament or other legislative body attributed to a particular legislative 
provision in a situation or context of which they may only dimly, if at all, have 
been aware. Taking Parliament by way of example, legislation is drafted by 
legal advisers in a ministry, redrafted by the parliamentary draftsmen, 
subjected to public debate in committee, where it may be revised and 
amended, and then passed by a legislative body, many of whose members 
have little close acquaintance with its terms and are motivated only by their or 
their party's stance on the broad principles in the legislation.  In those 
circumstances to speak of an intention of parliament is entirely artificial. The 
most that can be said is that in a broad sense legislation in a democracy is 
taken to be a reflection of the views of the electorate expressed through their 
representatives, although the fact that democratically elected legislatures 
sometimes pass legislation that is not supported by or unpopular with the 
majority of the electorate tends to diminish the force of this point.  
So, Endumeni stands for three propositions:  
a) that Schreiner JA's approach to statutory interpretation now applies to 
the interpretation of all legal documents;  
b) that the process of interpretation is an objective one and not a 
subjective one;  
c) that the will-theory, where interpretation is based on ascertaining the 
intention of a legal fiction, namely, the intention of the legislature, is 
dead. 
But for Endumeni to achieve the clarity it aims to provide to the interpretation 
of statutes, it must, in my view, stand for two more propositions:  
a) that the intention of the legislature theory is replaced with the standard 
of the reasonable reader; and 
b) that the context is confined to the enactment as a whole and excludes 
                                                 
68  Emphasis added. 
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evidence of its negotiating or legislative history.  
The most important contribution of Endumeni to statutory interpretation, in 
my view, is that it sounds the death-knell in our law for the intention of the 
legislature. Wallis JA considers the search for legislative intent as 
"unrealistic and misleading"69 because the process of legislative drafting is 
often riddled with difficulties that make it impossible to know what the 
intention was: legislation is drafted by legal advisors in a particular ministry, 
redrafted by parliamentary draftsmen, subjected to public debate 
committees, and very often passed by members of parliament who have not 
read let alone understood the Bill they are passing.70 An additional problem 
is that legislation by its nature is a product of negotiation, compromise and 
artifice, so it is impossible to know what the collective intention of Parliament 
is when they may have conflicting views on the meaning of a particular 
provision because it suits their party-political position. When Wallis JA 
speaks of an objective interpretive process, he means that we must interpret 
the language used in the document as it is and not on the basis of what 
Parliament thought, believed or intended it to mean. What does matter is 
whether Parliament said "yea" or "nay" - thereafter, the legislation takes on 
a life of its own, divorced from the will of Parliament.71 So, because Wallis 
JA speaks of an objective standard, it is clear that we must decide what the 
words mean on their most reasonable construction.72 Wallis JA does not 
speak of a reasonable reader standard, but it is in fact what our Courts do 
when they ignore the will theory. Consider for example the case of 
Democratic Alliance v African National Congress. Here the Court had to 
consider the word "stole" in an SMS sent by the DA to voters in Gauteng 
seven weeks before a national general election. The SMS read "[t]he 
Nkandla report shows how Zuma stole your money to build his R246mn 
home. Vote DA on 7 May to beat corruption. Together for change". Van der 
Westhuizen J says that we should understand the word "stole" in the way 
an ordinary reader would understand it reading the SMS, rather than in the 
technical sense, as the ANC proposed, which requires that one must first 
be convicted of theft. To support the conclusion that the reasonable reader 
would not understand the word to be used only in its technical sense, he 
quotes from the Concise Oxford English Dictionary (11th ed) to show its most 
                                                 
69  Endumeni para 21.  
70  Endumeni para 20.  
71  Waldron Dignity of Legislation 28.  
72  Endumeni para 18. "A sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to 
insensible or unbusiness like results"  
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likely construction.73 A similar approach has recently been taken by 
Froneman J in Marshall, where he rhetorically asks "Why should a unilateral 
practice of one part of the executive arm of government play a role in the 
determination of the reasonable meaning to be given to a statutory 
provision?"74 
There is another reason for doing away with the will theory, although it is 
not advanced by Wallis JA and is, in my view, the most important reason for 
dispensing with it - reference to the intention of the legislature is 
incompatible with the Constitution and the rule of law. Our courts are not the 
faithful agents of the legislature and the Constitution does not envision the 
courts as an organ faithfully searching for what Parliament meant or 
intended. This could perhaps be the case under a system of Parliamentary 
sovereignty, but it is repugnant to a system of constitutional supremacy. Our 
courts are faithful agents only to the text of the Constitution and the rights 
and values contained in it. This is what it means to have a "government of 
laws and not Parliamentarians".75 The only way we know what Parliament 
means is by what it actually says in the words it uses, reasonably 
interpreted. So even though one may find reference in our law reports to the 
intention of the legislature in the year 2018, we ought to be aware of 
Froneman J's condemnation of it in Marshall as a "rule originating in the 
context of legislative supremacy" which "misses our fundamental change 
from legislative supremacy to constitutional democracy".76 
So Wallis JA clearly takes us away from searching for the intention of the 
legislature as required by Venter and later followed by Centlivres JA in Jaga. 
But does it "adopt … the second of the two approaches mentioned by 
Schreiner"?77 The answer is that it does for the most part, but not entirely. 
Although Endumeni says that it adopts Schreiner's approach in Jaga, Wallis' 
treatment of the context is different from that of Schreiner. For Schreiner the 
context is not limited to the statute only; it goes beyond it. In fact, he tells us 
that the "context, as here used, is not limited to the rest of the statute 
                                                 
73  Democratic Alliance v African National Congress  2015 2 SA 232 (CC) para 162. Also 
see footnotes 162, 172, 203, 222 and 223, which illustrate this point.  
74  Marshall v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 2018 7 BCLR 830 
(CC) [10] (Marshall). 
75  To amend the words of the Massachusetts Constitution, Part the First, art XXX 
(1790). "In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall 
never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the executive 
shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial 
shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the 
end it may be a government of laws and not of men." 
76  Marshall paras 9, 10.  
77  Endumeni para 19.  
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regarded as throwing light of a dictionary kind on the part to be 
interpreted."78 Schreiner goes on to tell us that sometimes what is even 
more important than the words used is their purpose, scope and 
background. By all indications, he is quite happy to search for intent 
because it is part of the context.79 For Wallis, this does not appear to be the 
case. The only sensible reading of Endumeni, that is without contradiction, 
is that the context is limited to the enactment as a whole. In other words, 
when we interpret a word we do so in the light of the entirety of its written 
context and not its unwritten subjective context. We know in particular that 
Wallis excludes legislative history as a contextual consideration because he 
strongly objects to searching for the intention of Parliament, and because 
he describes the process of adopting legislation in unsparing terms: riddled 
with twisting processes, inattentive parliamentarians and partisanship which 
are clearly unhelpful to determining the most reasonable construction of a 
word.80 Although it remains open for our courts to determine whether 
legislative history should be considered as part of the context in statutory 
interpretation, it is difficult to see how it could be permissible in the light of 
this critique. But Wallis does leave one with a great deal of confusion as to 
the extent of the permissibility of the context, and a reading of both 
Endumeni and Bothma-Bato seem to envision a limited role for the context. 
Take for example, this statement from Bothma-Bato: "[w]hilst the starting 
point remains the words of the document, which are the only relevant 
medium through which the parties have expressed their contractual 
intentions, the process of interpretation does not stop at a perceived literal 
meaning of those words, but considers them in the light of all relevant and 
admissible context, including the circumstances in which the document 
came into being".81 If the written contract (or statute) is the only way to 
determine what is said - that is "the only relevant medium" - why is there a 
need to consider it in the light of all the "relevant admissible context"? And 
leaving aside for the moment whether there should be bright-line rules on 
the extent to which we can rely on the context, if what Wallis means by "the 
circumstances in which the document came into being" or "the material 
known to those responsible for its production" is the negotiation history of 
the contract (or the statute), then we are back to searching for the 
subjective, unwritten and fictitious mental state of what the parties or the 
legislature thought, meant or intended. So, if Endumeni is to be embraced 
without any internal logical contradiction, the relevant context can only be 
                                                 
78  Jaga para 662H.  
79  Jaga para 662H. 
80  Endumeni para 20.  
81  Bothma-Bato para 12.  
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the written context of the enactment as a whole.  
4 Battle of the context: the two towers, HLA Hart and Lon 
Fuller 
In 1958 a famous jurisprudential debate took place between Professors HLA 
Hart and Lon Fuller in the pages of the Harvard Law Review.82 In this part 
of the article I will use this debate to show that the linguistic context 
sometimes features in determining the legal meaning of words, but that it is 
less important than the ordinary linguistic meaning and should, therefore, 
be given a secondary role when determining the legal meaning of words. 
The debate concerned what is now considered the most famous 
hypothetical in the common law world: a rule that prohibits vehicles in a 
park.83 Hart's contribution was principally addressed to the claims of 
American Realists who saw and represented the law as indeterminate. He 
believed that their obsession with difficult cases on the fragile ends of the 
law misrepresented the everyday cases before courts where the law is 
determinate - in other words, taking the most difficult cases of the law does 
not represent its everyday operation. He later remarked in the Concept of 
Law that, "while they [the realists] throw a light which makes us see much 
in the law that lay hidden, the light is so bright that it blinds us to the 
remainder, and so leaves us still without a clear view of the whole".84 Fuller, 
who was no realist, responded to Hart because for him it is impossible for 
language to be a source of legal determinacy without regard to the context 
in which the language is used. The meaning of legal words, for Fuller, is 
always entirely a function of the context in which they are used.85 So which 
activities are proscribed by the rule, "no vehicles in the park"?  
Hart distinguished between the core of determinate meaning and the 
penumbra of uncertain meaning. In the core, words have a settled meaning 
independent of their context, and the settled meaning is informed by 
something that all speakers of a particular language share, even when the 
context and circumstances are not known.86 This is why someone who is 
competent in the English language - or any of the other 11 official languages 
- may pick up the South African Constitution and understand that Parliament 
is made up of two chambers; that the National Assembly may not have more 
than 400 representatives; that no law may override the text of the 
                                                 
82  Hart 1958 Harv L Rev 593; Fuller 1958 Harv L Rev 630. 
83  Schauer 2008 NYU L Rev 1109. 
84  Hart Concept of Law 2. 
85  Fuller 1958 Harv L Rev 664.  
86  Schauer 2008 NYU L Rev 1120-1121. 
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Constitution, and that when the President constitutes his or her cabinet, all 
the members of cabinet must be Members of the Assembly save for a 
maximum of two. One does not have to know anything about South Africa, 
its history of disenfranchisement, Parliamentary sovereignty or the 
circumstances in which the Constitution was adopted for this to be clear. 
The context does nothing to influence or determine the operation of these 
rules. So when a case falls within the core of the general terms of the text, 
the judge is obliged to apply the rule.87 But there are instances where this 
is not the case, and here we are concerned with the penumbra of debatable 
cases that could fall either within or outside of the rule. Let's assume that 
the same person turns to sections of the Constitution that concern the "best 
interest of the child", or "just and equitable" compensation when property is 
expropriated, or reasonableness as the standard against which to test 
government action in realising socio-economic rights. Here the kind of 
conduct or activity required by these terms is nebulous and creates 
debatable cases about what is included and excluded by the rule. In these 
cases, Hart argued, the rules run out and the judge should use his or her 
discretion and rely on other considerations when deciding such cases, 
including moral and political considerations.88 Unlike legal formalists, Hart 
did not deny the law's indeterminacy. He considered the formalist rejection 
of law's occasional indeterminacy as an ideological response grounded in 
the separation of powers rather than a social fact that judges also make law 
when law runs out.89 So because language plays a role in the law's 
determinacy, and because there are occasions where language might be 
indeterminate, the law in these cases will naturally be indeterminate.  
But Fuller was not concerned with the indeterminacy of the penumbra alone. 
He contended that all interpretation involves indeterminacy, including that 
at the core. There can never be a settled ordinary meaning, for Fuller. So, 
he said to Hart, what if a group of local patriots construct a memorial by 
mounting in the park a working truck that was used during the Second World 
War? Clearly, it would fall within the core of its general meaning but serves 
a completely different purpose to the rule which prohibits vehicles in the park 
- assuming that the rule created was to prevent congestion and noise. Hart 
quite simply points out that it might be the case that a system's norms 
require looking to the purpose, but in doing so one is not concerned with 
what the law ought to be, but merely recognising a matter of social fact.90 
                                                 
87  Hart Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 63-64. 
88  A case that illustrates this well is Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 
(CC). 
89  Hart Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 106-107. 
90  Hart Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 106. 
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So it may be the case that the vehicle used as a memorial in this instance 
falls outside the core. Looking to the purpose does not render the law 
indeterminate because language is not always indeterminate. And so the 
purpose does not exist as an independent reason to give meaning to words, 
as Fuller would contend.  
To illustrate this point in practice, consider this: the no-vehicle rule is 
adopted in Green Point Urban Park to prevent noise pollution. If X were to 
drive through the park in a sports car with an engine that makes a loud 
noise, this would clearly fall within the core and be proscribed. If X, perhaps 
too eager to fulfil his civic responsibilities, were to decide to take his noisy 
lawnmower to the park to cut the grass, this might similarly be proscribed, 
although one might not at first instance consider the lawnmower to be a 
"vehicle". But if X, after a football match at the nearby stadium, blows his 
vuvuzela in the park, this is not proscribed by the rule. The reason for this 
is that the purpose of suppressing noise does not exist as an independent 
reason for the application of the rule, but is a subsidiary and reinforcing 
reason for it that must still have a relationship to the core.91 The core limits 
the purpose. This was not the case for Fuller, as his example prohibiting 
sleeping at the train station shows. Fuller says that we assume that the no-
sleeping rule was adopted to prevent homeless persons from using the 
station as their residence. If the businessman who waits for his train 
happens to fall asleep, he is not considered to have broken the rule, but the 
homeless person who comes to the station with a blanket and pillow but 
remains awake is covered by the rule. For Fuller, the purpose always 
overrides the ordinary meaning of the rule.  
It would be dishonest to suggest that Endumeni is authority for the purpose 
of always overriding the plain words. This is not so. In fact, Wallis JA tells 
us that sometimes either the context or the plain meaning of a word could 
predominate over the other element, depending on their level of clarity.92 
But he goes on to tell us that when Courts claim that the ordinary meaning 
is clear in its context and that there is little ambiguity, they misunderstand 
how language works because for him, like Fuller, it is always context-
specific. He tells us that seeing language as isolated from its context is "a 
product of a time when language was viewed differently and regarded as 
likely to have a fixed and definite meaning, a view that the experience of 
lawyers down the years as well as linguistics, has shown to be mistaken."93 
                                                 
91  See Fagan 2010 SALJ 613-615; Fagan 2004 Acta Juridica 118-121.  
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And to support this view he cites a speech delivered by the former Chief 
Justice of New South Wales, James Spigelman, which in turn relies on the 
philosophy of Wittgenstein and Fuller.94 Assuming briefly that it is a 
"misnomer", as Wallis JA characterises it, to believe that words can be 
understood a-contextually, it does not follow that meaning can be 
determined only with reference to the full context in which words are used. 
If we knew nothing about the meaning of individual words, sentences, 
grammar and syntax, we would never be able to understand each other.95 
The full context might give us clarity, but it will do nothing to help us 
understand what the sentence "the boy climbed the tree" means. We know 
what this means, divorced from its context, because we know that the "boy" 
means "a boy", the tree means "a tree" and that climbed defines an activity 
that is different from say "jumped" or "walked" or "ran". So when Wallis cites 
the speech of Justice Spigelman, which relies on Wittgenstein to prove that 
words cannot be understood in isolation, he suggests that we should be 
aware that Wittgenstein was not concerned with individual words as a unit 
of meaning. Instead he was concerned with how conventions are a function 
of language and meaning. So the word "boy" as it is used by a specific 
linguistic community determines its meaning. The community could decide 
over time that the word boy means something other than a male child, but 
it is the community that determines the unit of meaning.96 
Consider the following example used by Spigelman in his speech and 
quoted by Wallis in a footnote of Endumeni:97 "[I]n an adaptation of an 
example originally propounded by Ludwig Wittgenstein, parents leave their 
young children in the care of a babysitter with an instruction to teach them 
a game of cards. The babysitter would not be acting in accordance with 
these instructions if he or she taught the children to play strip poker." Wallis 
says that this example "vividly" shows why context is always important. 
Does it? One does not need any context to know what the instruction "teach 
them a game of cards" means. We know what this means because we 
understand the ordinary meaning of each word in the sentence. It is true 
that the conventions of that community would probably consider it 
                                                 
94  See footnotes 33 and 34 of Endumeni citing "The Principle of Legality and the Clear 
Statement Principle" opening address by the Honourable JJ Spigelman AC, Chief 
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inappropriate for a babysitter to teach children strip poker, but this has 
nothing to do with the unit of meaning and everything to do with how 
conventions inform the meaning of words. What matters, is that we know 
what their unit of meaning is. This is why, I imagine, we adopted the 
textualist rule, not because we didn't think that the context is important. We 
did, but we did not think that it was always important. Sometimes it helps us 
because the ordinary meaning is absurd, vague or ambiguous, but most of 
the time it is not. And the context does nothing to help us. Instead, it is likely 
to be used by litigants to cloud the most obvious and reasonable 
construction of words. Of course, we often got things wrong when applying 
the rule - sometimes because our judgments were outcomes-based - but 
this is not a reason to dispense with the rule. So the danger signalled by 
Wallis that courts should not give provisions a meaning that they would 
prefer over a meaning that they objectively have is all the more likely when 
we think that context is always important.  
5 Conclusion 
The first disagreement with Endumeni has come from a recent dissenting 
opinion of Majiedt JA and Davis AJA in CSARS v Daikin Air Conditioning 
South Africa.98 Although the dissent does not call for a return of the old 
textualist approach to statutory interpretation, it does argue that the context 
is fact-specific and can be applied to the interpretation of contracts, but not 
statutes. So it rejects the proposition in Endumeni that its unitary exercise 
can be applied to the interpretation of all legal documents and it does this 
based on the linguistic distinction between sentence meaning and speaker 
meaning. The dissent in Daikin is an interesting one because it seems to 
suggest that statutes communicate but do not converse. In other words, 
statutes are commands of an Austinian kind that must be interpreted 
formalistically. This approach contradicts Davis AJA's earlier approach to 
interpretation and adjudication.99 In any event, it is unlikely that we will reject 
Endumeni in the near future, but I predict that we will adopt rules limiting the 
context, especially where litigants seek to invoke all possible kinds of 
contexts in order to persuade courts that a word is opaque. 
The aim of this article was to tell the story of the conflict between the text 
and the context in South Africa. In doing so, I hope that it is clear that the 
back-and-forth experienced in the 20th century on placing emphasis on 
either the text or the context has not gone away with Endumeni. The same 
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99  See in particular, Davis Democracy and Deliberation 24, 177-179.  
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problem still plagues interpretation and it won't go away unless we are clear 
about the demands of Endumeni. Our courts also need to take statutory 
interpretation seriously. If the Constitutional Court truly embraces 
Endumeni, it should adopt its methodology rather than casually use the 
same terms as those used in the old approach, giving one the impression 
that there is an absence of method, and instead a desire to reach preferred 
outcomes. The same is true for courts around the country where it very often 
appears that something is said about the approach to statutory 
interpretation for the sake of the saying, rather than to embrace what is 
required. I hope that this article is not read as a call for the blanket rejection 
of Endumeni. I also hope that it is not seen as a pamphlet supporting the 
old approach. It is not. But I do hope that it has persuaded you that the 
emphasis put on the context by Endumeni is unwarranted and flawed. 
Endumeni has directed much-needed attention to the study of statutory 
interpretation, and we should appreciate that it has done away with the 
intention theory that has plagued interpretation for far too long in South 
Africa. But it is not without internal logical contradictions. Interpretation, as 
Wallis JA tells us, is the "process of attributing meaning to the words used 
in a document." My hope is that we stick to the document and give words a 
meaning that they reasonably have, and that when our courts tell us "we 
begin with the text", they end there too. But this is a battle for another day. 
Bibliography 
Literature 
Baker Introduction to English Legal History  
Baker JH An Introduction to English Legal History 4th ed (Butterworths 
London 2002) 
Cameron 1982 SALJ  
Cameron E "Legal Chauvinism, Executive-mindedness and Justice LC 
Steyn's Impact on South African Law" 1982 SALJ 38-75 
Cowen 1980 THRHR  
Cowen DV "The Interpretation of Statutes and the Concept of the Intention 
of the Legislature" 1980 THRHR 374-399 
K PERUMALSAMY PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  25 
Cowen "Prolegomenon to a Restatement of the Principles of Statutory 
Interpretation" 
Cowen DV "Prolegomenon to a Restatement of the Principles of Statutory 
Interpretation" in Cowen S (ed) Cowen on Law: Selected Essays (Juta Cape 
Town 2008) 97-142 
Davis Democracy and Deliberation 
Davis D Democracy and Deliberation (Juta Cape Town 1999) 
Devenish Interpretation of Statutes 
Devenish GE Interpretation of Statutes (Juta Cape Town 1992) 
Devenish 1989 SALJ  
Devenish GE "Interpretation 'From the Bowels of the Act': An Essential 
Methodology for Unqualified Contextual Interpretation" 1989 SALJ 68-82 
Devenish 1991 De Jure  
Devenish GE "Fundamental Concepts and the Historical Roots of the 
Interpretation of Statutes in South Africa" 1991 De Jure 77-93 
Du Plessis Re-interpretation of Statutes 
Du Plessis L Re-interpretation of Statutes (LexisNexis Durban 2007) 
Fagan 2004 Acta Juridica  
Fagan A "Section 39(2) and Political Integrity" 2004 Acta Juridica 117-137 
Fagan 2010 SALJ  
Fagan A "The Secondary Role of the Spirit, Purport and Objects of the Bill 
of Rights in the Common Law's Development" 2010 SALJ 611-627 
Fuller 1958 Harv L Rev 
Fuller L "Positivism and Fidelity to the Law: A Reply to Professor Hart" 1958 
Harv L Rev 630-672 
Hart Concept of Law  
Hart HLA The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press Oxford 1961)  
Hart Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy  
Hart HLA Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford University Press 
Oxford 1983) 
Hart 1958 Harv L Rev 
Hart HLA "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" 1958 Harv L 
Rev 593-629 
K PERUMALSAMY PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  26 
Le Roux and Perumalsamy Constitutional Perspectives on Statutory 
Interpretation 
Le Roux W and Perumalsamy K Constitutional Perspectives on Statutory 
Interpretation (Oxford University Press Oxford forthcoming 2019) 
Popkin Statutes in Court  
Popkin W Statutes in Court: The History of Statutory Interpretation (Duke 
University Press Durham 1999)  
Schauer 2008 NYU L Rev 
Schauer F "A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park" 2008 NYU L Rev 1109-
1134 
Steyn Uitleg van Wette 
Steyn LC Die Uitleg van Wette (Juta Cape Town 1963) 
Van der Merwe Brown v Leyds 
Van der Merwe D Brown v Leyds: Who has the King's Voice? (LexisNexis 
Durban 2017) 
Waldron Dignity of Legislation 
Waldron J The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge University Press 
Cambridge 1999) 
Case law 
AfriForum v University of the Free State 2018 2 SA 185 (CC)  
Aumeye's Case (1305) YB 33-5 Edw I 
Belyng v Anon (1312) B & M 52 
Bothma-Bato Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport 2014 2 
SA 494 (SCA) 
CSARS v Daikin Air Conditioning South Africa (Pty) Ltd 80 SATC 330  
Dadoo v Krugersdorp Municipality 1920 AD 530  
De Villiers v Cape Law Society 1937 CPD 428  
De Villiers v The Cape, Divisional Council 1875 Buchanan 1980 50 
Democratic Alliance v African National Congress 2015 2 SA 232 (CC) 
K PERUMALSAMY PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  27 
Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 
10 BCLR 1027 (CC)  
Dr Bonham's Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 114 
Ebrahim v Minister of the Interior 1977 1 SA 665 (AD) 
Grey v Pearson 6 H L Cas 106 
Hess v The State (1895) 2 ORC 112 
Hleka v Johannesburg City Council 1949 2 SA 842 (A) 
Jaga v Donges 1950 4 SA 653 (A)  
Jordaan v Tshwane City and Four Similar Cases 2017 2 SA 295 (GP)  
KwaZulu Natal Joint Liaison Committee v MEC Department of Education, 
KwaZulu Natal 2013 4 SA 262 (CC)  
Magor and St Mellons RDC v Newport BC [1952] AC 189  
Marshall v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service 2018 7 
BCLR 830 (CC) 
Mathiba v Moschke 1920 AD 354  
Mavromati v Union Exploration Import (Pty) Ltd 1949 4 SA 917 (AD) 
Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) 
Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 
(SCA) 
National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC)  
Novaris South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Maphil Trading (Pty) Ltd 2016 1 SA 518 
(SCA)  
Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board 2001 3 SA 1247 (SCA)  
Principle Immigration Officer v Hawabu 1936 AD 26 
Public Carriers Association v Toll Road Concessionaries (Pty) Ltd 1990 1 
SA 925 (A) 
Public Servants Association v Head of Department of Health, Gauteng 2018 
2 SA 365 (CC)  
R v Westenraad 1941 OPD 103  
K PERUMALSAMY PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  28 
Reezen Ltd v Excellerate Holdings Ltd 2018 6 SA 571 (GJ) 
Rex v Detody 1926 AD 198 
S v Nteta 2016 2 SACR 641 (WCC) 
Seluka v Suskin and Salkow 1912 TPD 257  
Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery Ltd v Distillers Corporation SA Ltd 1962 1 All 
SA 485 (A) 
Swart v Cape Fabrix (Pty) Ltd 1979 1 SA 195 (A)  
Trinity Asset Management (Pty) Ltd v Grindstone Investments 132 (Pty) Ltd 
2018 1 SA 94 (CC) 
Tshwane City v Mitchell 2016 3 SA 231 (SCA)  
Van der Westhuizen v Arnold 2002 6 SA 453 (SCA)  
Venter v Rex 1907 TS 910 
Legislation 
Massachusetts Constitution, Part the First, art XXX (1790) 
Internet sources 
Spigelman 2005 http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/supreme_  
court/ll_sc.nsf/vwPrint1/SCO_speech_spigelman180 
Spigelman JJ 2005 The Principle of Legality and the Clear Statement 
Principle 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/supreme_court/ll_sc.nsf/vwPrint1/S
CO_speech_spigelman180 accessed 10 July 2019 
List of Abbreviations  
Harv L Rev Harvard Law Review 
NYU L Rev New York University Law Review  
SALJ South African Law Journal 
THRHR Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 
 
